Self-stabilization is an versatile approach to fault-tolerance since it permits a distributed system to recover from any transient fault that arbitrarily corrupts the contents of all memories in the system. Byzantine tolerance is an attractive feature of distributed system that permits to cope with arbitrary malicious behaviors.
Introduction
The advent of ubiquitous large-scale distributed systems advocates that tolerance to various kinds of faults and hazards must be included from the very early design of such systems. Self-stabilization [3, 5, 14] is a versatile technique that permits forward recovery from any kind of transient faults, while Byzantine Fault-tolerance [10] is traditionally used to mask the effect of a limited number of malicious faults. Making distributed systems tolerant to both transient and malicious faults is appealing yet proved difficult [6, 2, 12] as impossibility results are expected in many cases.
Two main paths have been followed to study the impact of Byzantine faults in the context of self-stabilization:
• Byzantine fault masking. In completely connected synchronous systems, one of the most studied problems in the context of self-stabilization with Byzantine faults is that of clock synchronization. In [1, 6] , probabilistic self-stabilizing protocols were proposed for up to one third of Byzantine processes, while in [4, 9] deterministic solutions tolerate up to one fourth and one third of Byzantine processes, respectively.
• Byzantine containment. For local tasks (i.e. tasks whose correctness can be checked locally, such as vertex coloring, link coloring, or dining philosophers), the notion of strict stabilization was proposed [12, 13, 11] . Strict stabilization guarantees that there exists a containment radius outside which the effect of permanent faults is masked, provided that the problem specification makes it possible to break the causality chain that is caused by the faults. As many problems are not local, it turns out that it is impossible to provide strict stabilization for those.
Our Contribution. In this paper, we investigate the possibility of Byzantine containment in a self-stabilizing setting for tasks that are global (i.e. for with there exists a causality chain of size r, where r depends on n the size of the network), and focus on a global problem, namely maximum metric tree construction (see [7, 8] ). As strict stabilization is impossible with such global tasks, we weaken the containment constraint by relaxing the notion of containment radius to containment area, that is Byzantine processes may disturb infinitely often a set of processes which depends on the topology of the system and on the location of Byzantine processes.
The main contribution of this paper is to present new possibility results for containing the influence of unbounded Byzantine behaviors. In more details, we define the notion of topologyaware strict stabilization as the novel form of the containment and introduce containment area to quantify the quality of the containment. The notion of topology-aware strict stabilization is weaker than the strict stabilization but is stronger than the classical notion of self-stabilization (i.e. every topology-aware strictly stabilizing protocol is self-stabilizing, but not necessarily strictly stabilizing).
To demonstrate the possibility and effectiveness of our notion of topology-aware strict stabilization, we consider maximum metric tree construction. It is shown in [12] that there exists no strictly stabilizing protocol with a constant containment radius for this problem. In this paper, we provide a topology-aware strictly stabilizing protocol for maximum metric tree construction and we prove that the containment area of this protocol is optimal.
Distributed System
A distributed system S = (P, L) consists of a set P = {v 1 , v 2 , . . . , v n } of processes and a set L of bidirectional communication links (simply called links). A link is an unordered pair of distinct processes. A distributed system S can be regarded as a graph whose vertex set is P and whose link set is L, so we use graph terminology to describe a distributed system S.
Processes u and v are called neighbors if (u, v) ∈ L. The set of neighbors of a process v is denoted by N v , and its cardinality (the degree of v) is denoted by ∆ v (= |N v |). The degree ∆ of a distributed system S = (P, L) is defined as ∆ = max{∆ v | v ∈ P }. We do not assume existence of a unique identifier for each process. Instead we assume each process can distinguish its neighbors from each other by locally arranging them in some arbitrary order: the k-th neighbor of a process v is denoted by N v (k) (1 ≤ k ≤ ∆ v ). The distance between two processes u and v is the length of the shortest path between u and v.
In this paper, we consider distributed systems of arbitrary topology. We assume that a single process is distinguished as a root, and all the other processes are identical.
We adopt the shared state model as a communication model in this paper, where each process can directly read the states of its neighbors.
The variables that are maintained by processes denote process states. A process may take actions during the execution of the system. An action is simply a function that is executed in an atomic manner by the process. The actions executed by each process is described by a finite set of guarded actions of the form guard −→ statement . Each guard of process u is a boolean expression involving the variables of u and its neighbors.
A global state of a distributed system is called a configuration and is specified by a product of states of all processes. We define C to be the set of all possible configurations of a distributed system S. For a process set R ⊆ P and two configurations ρ and ρ ′ , we denote ρ R → ρ ′ when ρ changes to ρ ′ by executing an action of each process in R simultaneously. Notice that ρ and ρ ′ can be different only in the states of processes in R. For completeness of execution semantics, we should clarify the configuration resulting from simultaneous actions of neighboring processes. The action of a process depends only on its state at ρ and the states of its neighbors at ρ, and the result of the action reflects on the state of the process at ρ ′ .
A schedule of a distributed system is an infinite sequence of process sets. Let Q = R 1 , R 2 , . . . be a schedule, where R i ⊆ P holds for each i (i ≥ 1). An infinite sequence of configurations e = ρ 0 , ρ 1 , . . . is called an execution from an initial configuration ρ 0 by a schedule Q, if e satisfies ρ i−1
. Process actions are executed atomically, and we also assume that a distributed daemon schedules the actions of processes, i.e. any subset of processes can simultaneously execute their actions.
The set of all possible executions from ρ 0 ∈ C is denoted by E ρ 0 . The set of all possible executions is denoted by E, that is, E = ρ∈C E ρ . We consider asynchronous distributed systems where we can make no assumption on schedules except that any schedule is weakly fair : every process is contained in infinite number of subsets appearing in any schedule.
In this paper, we consider (permanent) Byzantine faults: a Byzantine process (i.e. a Byzantinefaulty process) can make arbitrary behavior independently from its actions. If v is a Byzantine process, v can repeatedly change its variables arbitrarily.
Self-Stabilizing Protocol Resilient to Byzantine Faults
Problems considered in this paper are so-called static problems, i.e. they require the system to find static solutions. For example, the spanning-tree construction problem is a static problem, while the mutual exclusion problem is not. Some static problems can be defined by a specification predicate (shortly, specification), spec(v), for each process v: a configuration is a desired one (with a solution) if every process satisfies spec(v). A specification spec(v) is a boolean expression on variables of P v (⊆ P ) where P v is the set of processes whose variables appear in spec(v). The variables appearing in the specification are called output variables (shortly, O-variables) . In what follows, we consider a static problem defined by specification spec(v). Self-Stabilization. A self-stabilizing protocol ( [3] ) is a protocol that eventually reaches a legitimate configuration, where spec(v) holds at every process v, regardless of the initial configuration. Once it reaches a legitimate configuration, every process never changes its O-variables and always satisfies spec (v) . From this definition, a self-stabilizing protocol is expected to tolerate any number and any type of transient faults since it can eventually recover from any configuration affected by the transient faults. However, the recovery from any configuration is guaranteed only when every process correctly executes its action from the configuration, i.e., we do not consider existence of permanently faulty processes. Strict stabilization. When (permanent) Byzantine processes exist, Byzantine processes may not satisfy spec(v). In addition, correct processes near the Byzantine processes can be influenced and may be unable to satisfy spec(v). Nesterenko and Arora [12] define a strictly stabilizing protocol as a self-stabilizing protocol resilient to unbounded number of Byzantine processes.
Given an integer c, a c-correct process is a process defined as follows.
Definition 1 (c-correct process) A process is c-correct if it is correct ( i.e. not Byzantine) and located at distance more than c from any Byzantine process.
given at most f Byzantine processes, in any execution starting from ρ, every c-correct process v always satisfies spec(v) and never changes its O-variables.
The parameter c of Definition 2 refers to the containment radius defined in [12] . The parameter f refers explicitly to the number of Byzantine processes, while [12] dealt with unbounded number of Byzantine faults (that is f ∈ {0 . . . n}).
Definition 3 ((c, f )-strict stabilization) A protocol is (c, f )-strictly stabilizing for specification spec if, given at most f Byzantine processes, any execution e = ρ 0 , ρ 1 , . . . contains a configuration ρ i that is (c, f )-contained for spec.
An important limitation of the model of [12] is the notion of r-restrictive specifications. Intuitively, a specification is r-restrictive if it prevents combinations of states that belong to two processes u and v that are at least r hops away. An important consequence related to Byzantine tolerance is that the containment radius of protocols solving those specifications is at least r. For some problems, such as the spanning tree construction we consider in this paper, r can not be bounded to a constant. We can show that there exists no (o(n), 1)-strictly stabilizing protocol for the spanning tree construction. Topology-aware strict stabilization. In the former paragraph, we saw that there exist a number of impossibility results on strict stabilization due to the notion of r-restrictive specifications. To circumvent this impossibility result, we define here a new notion, which is weaker than the strict stabilization: the topology-aware strict stabilization (denoted by TA-strict stabilization for short). Here, the requirement to the containment radius is relaxed, i.e. the set of processes which may be disturbed by Byzantines ones is not reduced to the union of c-neighborhood of Byzantines processes but can be defined depending on the topology of the system and on Byzantine processes location.
In the following, we give formal definition of this new kind of Byzantine containment. From now, B denotes the set of Byzantine processes and S B (which is function of B) denotes a subset of V (intuitively, this set gathers all processes which may be disturbed by Byzantine processes). 
., every configuration is S B -legitimate and every S B -correct process never changes its O-variables.
The parameter S B of Definition 6 refers to the containment area. Any process which belongs to this set may be infinitely disturbed by Byzantine processes. The parameter f refers explicitly to the number of Byzantine processes.
Definition 7 ((S B , f )-topology-aware strict stabilization) A protocol is (S B , f )-topologyaware strictly stabilizing for specification spec if, given at most f Byzantine processes, any execution e = ρ 0 , ρ 1 , . . . contains a configuration ρ i that is (S B , f )-topology-aware contained for spec.
Note that, if B denotes the set of Byzantine processes and S B = {v ∈ V |min{d(v, b), b ∈ B} ≤ c}, then a (S B , f )-topology-aware strictly stabilizing protocol is a (c, f )-strictly stabilizing protocol. Then, a TA-strictly stabilizing protocol is generally weaker than a strictly stabilizing one, but stronger than a classical self-stabilizing protocol (that may never meet its specification in the presence of Byzantine processes).
The parameter S B is introduced to quantify the strength of fault containment, we do not require each process to know the actual definition of the set. Actually, the protocol proposed in this paper assumes no knowledge on this parameter.
Maximum Metric Tree Construction
In this work, we deal with maximum (routing) metric trees as defined in [8] (note that [7] provides a self-stabilizing solution to this problem). Informally, the goal of a routing protocol is to construct a tree that simultaneously maximizes the metric values of all of the nodes with respect to some total ordering ≺. In the following, we recall all definitions and notations introduced in [8] . 
Definition 8 (Routing metric) A routing metric (or just metric) is a five-tuple (M,
Any metric value m ∈ M \ {mr} satisfies the utility condition (that is, there exists w 0 , . . . ,
For instance, we provide the definition of three classical metrics with this model: the shortest path metric (SP), the flow metric (F), and the reliability metric (R).
) is a metric and wf is a function that assigns to each edge of S a weight in W .
Let a rooted path (from v) be a simple path from a process v to the root r. The next set of definitions are with respect to an assigned metric (M, W, met, mr, ≺, wf ) over a given system S.
Definition 10 (Metric of a rooted path)
The metric of a rooted path in S is the prefix sum of met over the edge weights in the path and mr.
For example, if a rooted path
Definition 11 (Maximum metric path) A rooted path p from v in S is called a maximum metric path with respect to an assigned metric if and only if for every other rooted path q from v in S, the metric of p is greater than or equal to the metric of q with respect to the total order ≺.
Definition 12 (Maximum metric of a node)
The maximum metric of a node v = r (or simply metric value of v) in S is defined by the metric of a maximum metric path from v. The maximum metric of r is mr.
Definition 13 (Maximum metric tree) A spanning tree T of S is a maximum metric tree with respect to an assigned metric over S if and only if every rooted path in T is a maximum metric path in N with respect to the assigned metric.
The goal of the work of [8] is the study of metrics that always allow the construction of a maximum metric tree. More formally, the definition follow.
Definition 14 (Maximizable metric) A metric is maximizable if and only if for any assignment of this metric over any system S, there is a maximum metric tree for S with respect to the assigned metric.
Note that [7] provides a self-stabilizing protocol to construct a maximum metric tree with respect to any maximizable metric. Moreover, [8] provides a fully characterization of maximizable metrics as follow. 
Theorem 1 (Characterization of maximizable metrics [8]) A metric is maximizable if and only if this metric is bounded and monotonic.
Given a maximizable metric M = (M, W, mr, met, ≺), the aim of this work is to construct a maximum metric tree with respect to M which spans the system in a self-stabilizing way in a system subject to permanent Byzantine failures. It is obvious that these Byzantine processes may disturb some correct processes. It is why, we relax the problem in the following way: we want to construct a maximum metric forest with respect to M. The root of any tree of this forest must be either the real root or a Byzantine process.
Each process v has three O-variables: a pointer to its parent in its tree (prnt v ∈ N v ∪ {⊥}), a level which stores its current metric value (level v ∈ M ), and a variable which stores its distance to the root of its tree (dist v ∈ {0, . . . , D}). Obviously, Byzantine process may disturb (at least) their neighbors. We use the following specification of the problem.
We introduce new notations as follows. Given an assigned metric (M, W, met, mr, ≺, wf ) over the system S and two processes u and v, we denote by µ(u, v) the maximum metric of node u when v plays the role of the root of the system and by w u,v the weight of the edge {u, v} (that is, the value of wf ({u, v})).
Definition 17 (M-path) Given an assigned metric M = (M, W, mr, met, ≺, wf ) over a system S, a path (v 0 , . . . , v k ) (k ≥ 1) of S is a M-path if and only if: 3. ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, met(level
We define the specification predicate spec(v) of the maximum metric tree construction with respect to a maximizable metric M as follows. Following discussion of Section 3, it is obvious that there exists no strictly stabilizing protocol for this problem. It is why we consider the weaker notion of topology-aware strict stabilization. First, we show an impossibility result in order to define the best possible containment area. Then, we provide a maximum metric tree construction protocol which is (S B , f )-TA-strictly stabilizing where f ≤ n − 1 which match these optimal containment area, namely:
Figures from 1 to 3 provide some examples of containment areas with respect to several maximizable metrics.
We introduce here a new definition that is used in the following. 
Impossibility Result
In this section, we show that there exists some constraints on the containment area of any topologyaware strictly stabilizing for the maximum metric tree construction depending on the metric. Proof Let M = (M, W, mr, met, ≺) be a maximizable metric and P be a (A B , 1)-TA-strictly stabilizing protocol for maximum metric spanning tree construction protocol with respect to M where A B S B . We must distinguish the following cases:
Denote by m the metric value such that M = {m}. For any system and for any process v = r,
Consider the following system: V = {r, u, v, b} and E = {{r, u}, {u, v}, {v, b}} (b is a Byzantine process). As S B = {u, v} and A B S B , we have: u / ∈ A B or v / ∈ A B . Consider now the following configuration ρ 0 0 : Figure 4 , other variables may have arbitrary values). Note that ρ 0 0 is A B -legitimate for spec (whatever A B is).
Assume now that b behaves as a correct process with respect to P. Then, by convergence of P in a fault-free system starting from ρ 0 0 which is not legitimate (remember that a strictlystabilizing protocol is a special case of self-stabilizing protocol), we can deduce that the system reaches in a finite time a configuration ρ 0 1 (see Figure 4 ) in which: prnt r = ⊥, prnt u = r, 
and dist b = 3. Note that processes u and v modify their O-variables in this execution. This contradicts the (A B , 1)-TA-strict stabilization of P (whatever A B is).
By definition of a bounded metric, we can deduce that there exist m ∈ M and w ∈ W such that m = met(mr, w) ≺ mr. Then, we must distinguish the following cases:
Case 2.1: m is a fixed point of M. Consider the following system: V = {r, u, v, b}, E = {{r, u}, {u, v}, {v, b}}, w r,u = w v,b = w, and w u,v = w ′ (b is a Byzantine process). As for any w ′ ∈ W , met(m, w ′ ) = m (by definition of a fixed point), we have: S B = {u, v}. Since A B S B , we have: u / ∈ A B or v / ∈ A B . Consider now the following configuration ρ 1 0 : Figure 4 , other variables may have arbitrary values). Note that ρ 1 0 is A B -legitimate for spec (whatever A B is). Assume now that b behaves as a correct process with respect to P. Then, by convergence of P in a fault-free system starting from ρ 1 0 which is not legitimate (remember that a strictly-stabilizing protocol is a special case of self-stabilizing protocol), we can deduce that the system reaches in a finite time a configuration ρ 1 1 (see Figure 4 ) in which: prnt r = ⊥, prnt u = r, prnt v = u, prnt b = v, level r = mr, level u = level v = level b = m (since m is a fixed point), dist r = 0, dist u = 1, dist v = 2 and dist b = 3. Note that processes u and v modify their O-variables in this execution. This contradicts the (A B , 1)-TA-strict stabilization of P (whatever A B is).
Case 2.2: m is not a fixed point of M.
This implies that there exists w ′ ∈ W such that: met(m, w ′ ) ≺ m (remember that M is bounded). Consider the following system: V = {r, u, v, v ′ , b}, E = {{r, u}, {u, v}, {u, v ′ }, {v, b}, {v ′ , b}}, w r,u = w v,b = w v ′ ,b = w, and w u,v = w u,v ′ = w ′ (b is a Byzantine process). We can see that S B = {v, v ′ }. Since A B S B , we have: v / ∈ A B or v ′ / ∈ A B . Consider now the following configuration ρ 2 0 : Figure 4 , other variables may have arbitrary values). Note that ρ 2 0 is A B -legitimate for spec (whatever A B is). Assume now that b behaves as a correct process with respect to P. Then, by convergence of P in a fault-free system starting from ρ 2 0 which is not legitimate (remember that a strictly-stabilizing protocol is a special case of self-stabilizing protocol), we can deduce that the system reaches in a finite time a configuration ρ 2 1 (see Figure 4 ) in which: 
Topology-Aware Strict Stabilizing Protocol
In this section, we provide our self-stabilizing protocol that achieve optimal containment areas to permanent Byzantine failures for constructing a maximum metric tree for any maximizable metric M = (M, W, met, mr, ≺). More formally, our protocol is (S B , f )-strictly stabilizing, that is optimal with respect to the result of Theorem 2. Our protocol is borrowed from the one of [7] (which is self-stabilizing). The key idea of this protocol is to use the distance variable (upper bounded by a given constant D) to detect and break cycles of process which has the same maximum metric. The main modification we bring to this protocol follows. In the initial protocol, when a process modifies its parent, it chooses arbitrarily one of the "better" neighbors (with respect to the metric). To achieve the (S B , f )-TA-strict stabilization, we must ensures a fair selection along the set of its neighbor. We perform this fairness with a round-robin order along the set of neighbors. Our solution is presented as Algorithm 4.1.
In the following, we provide the proof of the TA-strict stabilization of SSMAX . Remember that the real root r can not be a Byzantine process by hypothesis. Note that the subsystem whose set of nodes is V \ S B is connected respectively by boundedness of the metric. Variables:
pointer on the parent of v in the tree.
levelv ∈ {m ∈ M |m mr}: metric of the node. distv ∈ {0, . . . , D}: distance to the root.
Macro:
For any subset A ⊆ Nv, choose(A) returns the first element of A which is bigger than prntv (in a round-robin fashion).
Rules:
Proof Let v ∈ V be a process. By contradiction, assume that there exists a neighbor u of v such that:
Let q ∈ B ∪ {r} one of the process such that max ≺ p∈B∪{r} {µ(u, p)} = µ(u, q). Then, we have:
This contradicts the fact that q ∈ B ∪ {r} and shows us the result. Given a configuration ρ ∈ C and a metric value m ∈ M , let us define the following predicate:
For any metric value m ∈ M , the predicate IM m is closed by actions of SSMAX .
Proof Let m be a metric value (m ∈ M ). Let ρ ∈ C be a configuration such that IM m (ρ) = true and ρ ′ ∈ C be a configuration such that ρ R → ρ ′ is a step of SSMAX . If the root process r ∈ R (respectively a Byzantine process b ∈ R), then we have level r = mr (respectively level b mr) in ρ ′ by construction of (R r ) (respectively by definition of level b ). Hence, If we apply the Lemma 1 to met and to neighbor p, we obtain the following property:
Consequently, we obtain that, in ρ ′ :
We can deduce that IM d (ρ ′ ) = true, that concludes the proof. Given an assigned metric to a system G, we can observe that the set of metrics value M is finite and that we can label elements of M by m 0 = mr, m 1 , . . . , m k in a way such that ∀i ∈ {0, . . . , k − 1}, m i+1 ≺ m i .
We introduce the following notations:
Proof Let m i be a metric value from M and ρ be a configuration of LC m i . By construction, any process v ∈ V m i satisfies spec(v) in ρ.
In particular, the root process satisfies: prnt r = ⊥, level r = mr, and dist r = 0. By construction of SSMAX , r is not enabled and then never modifies its O-variables (since the guard of the rule of r does not involve the state of its neighbors).
In the same way, any process v ∈ V m i satisfies: Hence, process v is not enabled in ρ.
Assume that there exists a process v ∈ V m i that take a step ρ ′ R → ρ ′′ in an execution starting from ρ (without loss of generality, assume that v is the first process of v ∈ V m i that takes a step in this execution). Then, we know that v = r. This activation implies that a neighbor u / ∈ V m i (since v is the first process of V m i to take a step) of v modified its level u variable to a metric value m ∈ M such that level v ≺ met(m, w u,v ) in ρ ′ (note that O-variables of v and prnt v remain consistent since v is the first process to take a step in this execution).
Hence, we have , w u,v ) . Moreover, the closure of IM B (established in Lemma 2) ensures us that m max ≺ p∈B∪{r} {µ(u, p)}. By boundedness of M, we can deduce
. This is contradictory with the result of Lemma 1.
In conclusion, any process v ∈ V m i takes no step in any execution starting from ρ and then always satisfies spec(v). Then, the closure of IM B (established in Lemma 2) concludes the proof.
Lemma 4 Any configuration of LC is (S
Proof This is a direct application of the Lemma 3 to LC = LC m i . Lemma 5 Starting from any configuration of C, any execution of SSMAX reaches in a finite time a configuration of LC mr . Proof Let ρ be an arbitrary configuration. Then, it is obvious that IM mr (ρ) is satisfied. By closure of IM mr (proved in Lemma 2), we know that IM mr remains satisfied in any execution starting from ρ.
If r does not satisfy spec(r) in ρ, then r is continuously enabled. Since the scheduling is weakly fair, r is activated in a finite time and then r satisfies spec(r) in a finite time. Denote by ρ ′ the first configuration in which spec(r) holds. Note that r takes no step in any execution starting from ρ ′ .
The boundedness of M implies that P mr induces a connected subsystem. If P mr = {r}, then we proved that ρ ′ ∈ LC mr and we have the result.
Otherwise, observe that, for any configuration of an execution starting from ρ ′ , if all processes of P mr are not enabled, then all processes v of P mr satisfy spec(v). Assume now that there exists an execution e starting from ρ ′ in which some processes of P mr takes infinitely many steps. By construction, at least one of these processes (note it v) has a neighbor u which takes only a finite number of steps in e (recall that P mr induces a connected subsystem and that r takes no step in e). After u takes its last step of e, we can observe that level u = mr and dist u < D − 1 (otherwise, u is activated in a finite time that contradicts its construction).
As v can execute consequently (R 1 ) only a finite number of times (since the incrementation of dist v is bounded by D), we can deduce that v executes (R 2 ) or (R 3 ) infinitely often. In both cases, u belongs to the set which is the parameter of function choose. By the fairness of this function, we can deduce that prnt v = u in a finite time in e. Then, the construction of u implies that v is never enabled in the sequel of e. This is contradictory with the construction of e.
Consequently, any execution starting from ρ ′ reaches in a finite time a configuration such that all processes of P mr are not enabled. We can deduce that this configuration belongs to LC mr , that ends the proof. First, if a process v joins A j (that is, v / ∈ A j−1 but v ∈ A j ), then it takes a distance value greater or equals to f (ρ j+1 ) by construction of the protocol. We can deduce that the fact that some processes join A j does not decrease f . Moreover, the construction of the protocol implies that a process v such that v ∈ A j and v ∈ A j+1 can not decrease its distance value in the step ρ j → ρ j+1 .
Then, consider for a given configuration ρ j a process v ∈ A j such that dist v = f (ρ j ) < D. We distinguish the following cases:
The fact that v ∈ I m i , the boundedness of M and the closure of IM m i imply that prnt v ∈ A j (and, hence that level prntv = m i ). Then, by construction of f (ρ j ), we know that dist v = dist prntv + 1 (otherwise, we do not have dist v = f (ρ j ) since prnt v has a smaller distance value). Consequently, v is enabled by (R 1 ) in ρ j and dist v increase of at least 1 during the step ρ j → ρ j+1 if this rule is executed. In all cases, v is enabled by (R 1 ) in ρ j and the execution of this rule either increases strictly dist v or removes v from A j+1 .
As I m i is finite and the scheduling is weakly fair, we can deduce that f increases in a finite time in any execution starting from ρ j . By repeating the argument at most D times, we can deduce that e contains a configuration ρ k such that f (ρ k ) = D, that shows the result. Lemma 7 For any m i ∈ M and for any configuration ρ ∈ LC m i such that ∀v ∈ I m i , level v = m i ⇒ dist v = D, any execution of SSMAX starting from ρ reaches in a finite time a configuration such that:
Proof Let m i ∈ M be an arbitrary metric value and ρ 0 be a configuration of
. . be an arbitrary execution starting from ρ 0 . For any configuration ρ j of e, let us denote E ρ j = {v ∈ I m i |level v = m i }. By the closure of IM m i (which holds by definition in ρ 0 ) established in Lemma 2, we obtain the result if there exists a configuration ρ j of e such that E ρ j = ∅.
If there exists some processes v ∈ I m i \ E ρ 0 (and hence level v ≺ m i ) such that prnt v ∈ E ρ 0 and met(level prntv , w v,prntv ) = m i in ρ 0 , then we can observe that these processes are continuously enabled by (R 1 ). As the scheduling is weakly fair, v activates this rule in a finite time and then, level v = m i and dist v = D. In other words, v joins E ρ l for a given integer l. We can conclude that there exists an integer k such that for any
Then, we prove that, for any integer j ≥ k, we have E ρ j+1 ⊆ E ρ j . For the sake of contradiction, assume that there exists an integer j ≥ k and a process v ∈ I m i such that v ∈ E ρ j+1 and v / ∈ E ρ j . Without loss of generality, assume that j is the smallest integer which performs these properties. Let us study the following cases:
Case 1: If v activates (R 1 ) during the step ρ j → ρ j+1 , then we know that prnt v / ∈ E ρ j in ρ j (otherwise, we have a contradiction with the fact that v ∈ E ρ j+1 ). But in this case, we have:
Case 2: If v activates either (R 2 ) or (R 3 ) during the step ρ j → ρ j+1 , then v chooses a new parent which has a distance smaller than D − 1 in ρ j . This implies that this new parent does not belongs to E ρ j . Then, we have level prntv ≺ m i . The boundedness of M implies that level v ≺ m i in ρ j+1 that contradicts the fact that v ∈ E ρ j+1 .
In the two cases, our claim is satisfied. In other words, there exists a point of the execution afterwards the set E can not grow (this implies that, if a process leave the set E, it is a definitive leaving). Assume now that there exists a step ρ j → ρ j+1 (with j ≥ k) such that a process v ∈ E ρ j is activated. Observe that the closure of IM m i implies that v can not be activated by the rule (R 3 ). If v activates (R 1 ) during this step, then v modifies its level during this step (otherwise, we have a contradiction with the fact that level prntv = m i ⇒ dist v = D). The closure of IM m i implies that v leaves the set E during this step. If v activates (R 2 ) during this step, then v chooses a new parent which has a distance smaller than D − 1 in ρ j . This implies that this new parent does not belongs to E ρ j . Then, we have level prntv ≺ m i . The boundedness of M implies that level v ≺ m i in ρ j+1 . In other words, if a process of E ρ j is activated during the step ρ j → ρ j+1 , then it satisfies v / ∈ E ρ j+1 . Finally, observe that the construction of the protocol and the construction of the bound D ensures us that any process v ∈ I m i such that dist v = D is activated in a finite time. In conclusion, we obtain that there exists an integer j such that E ρ j = ∅, that implies the result. Proof Let m i be a metric value of M and ρ be an arbitrary configuration of LC m i . We know by Lemma 8 that any execution starting from ρ reaches in a finite time a configuration ρ ′ such that IM m i+1 holds. By closure of IM and of LC m i (established respectively in Lemma 2 and 3), we know that any configuration of any execution starting from ρ ′ belongs to LC m i and satisfies IM m i+1 .
We know that V m i = ∅ since r ∈ V m i for any i ≥ 0. Remind that V m i+1 is connected by the boundedness of M. Then, we know that there exists at least one process p of P m i+1 which has a neighbor q in V m i such that µ(p, r) = met(µ(q, r), w p,q ). Moreover, Lemma 3 ensures us that any process of V m i takes no step in any executions tarting from ρ ′ .
Observe that, for any configuration of an execution starting from ρ ′ , if all processes of P m i+1 are not enabled, then all processes v of P m i+1 satisfy spec(v). Assume now that there exists an execution e starting from ρ ′ in which some processes of P m i+1 take infinitely many steps. By construction, at least one of these processes (note it v) has a neighbor u such that µ(v, r) = met(µ(u, r), w v,u ) which takes only a finite number of steps in e (recall the construction of p). After u takes its last step of e, we can observe that level u = µ(u, r) and dist u < D − 1 (otherwise, u is activated in a finite time that contradicts its construction).
As v can execute consequently (R 1 ) only a finite number of times (since the incrementation of dist v is bounded by D), we can deduce that v executes (R 2 ) or (R 3 ) infinitely often. In both cases, u belongs to the set which is the parameter of function choose (remind that IM m i+1 is satisfied and that u has the better possible metric along v's neighbors). By the construction of this function, we can deduce that prnt v = u in a finite time in e. Then, the construction of u implies that v is never enabled in the sequel of e. This is contradictory with the construction of e.
Consequently, any execution starting from ρ ′ reaches in a finite time a configuration such that all processes of P m i+1 are not enabled. We can deduce that this configuration belongs to LC m i+1 , that ends the proof.
Lemma 10
Starting from any configuration, any execution of SSMAX reaches a configuration of LC in a finite time.
Proof Let ρ be an arbitrary configuration. We know by Lemma 5 that any execution starting from ρ reaches in a finite time a configuration of LC mr = LC m 0 . Then, we can apply at most k times the result of Lemma 9 to obtain that any execution starting from ρ reaches in a finite time a configuration of LC m k = LC, that proves the result.
Theorem 3 SSMAX is a (S B , n − 1)-TA-strictly stabilizing protocol for spec.
Proof This result is a direct consequence of Lemmas 4 and 10.
Note that Theorem 2 ensures us that S B is the optimal containment area for a topology-aware strictly stabilizing protocol for spec.
Conclusion
We introduced a new notion of Byzantine containment in self-stabilization: the topology-aware strict stabilization. This notion relaxes the constraint on the containment radius of the strict stabilization to a containment area. In other words, the set of correct processes which may be infinitely often disturbed by Byzantine processes is a function depending on the topology of the system and on the actual location of Byzantine processes. We illustrated the relevance of this notion by providing a topology-aware strictly stabilizing protocol for the maximum metric tree construction problem which does not admit strictly stabilizing solution. Moreover, our protocol performs the optimal containment area with respect to the topology-aware strict stabilization.
Our work raises some opening questions. Number of problems do not accept strictly stabilizing solution. Does any of them admit a topology-aware strictly stabilizing solution ? Is it possible to give a necessary and/or sufficient condition for a problem to admit a topology-aware strictly stabilizing solution ? What happens if we consider only bounded Byzantine behavior ?
